Global Disorder | "What is left-wing foreign policy, Mr. van Aken?"

The Left Party is far from being in a position to help shape German foreign policy. What role does foreign policy play for the Left Party?

The Left Party has ensured that foreign missions and arms exports are even discussed critically, thus contributing to the fact that fewer and fewer German soldiers are serving abroad. We have made a difference here, without participating in government.

For many years, the Left Party's foreign policy positions were characterized by three so-called "defensive lines": no to arms deliveries, no to foreign missions, and no to NATO. Since the founding of Sahra Wagenknecht's coalition, the debate has changed. What are the cornerstones of the Left Party today?

The core of it is: We are internationalists. When injustice occurs somewhere, we all have to ask ourselves: How do we get involved? Our perspective is one of peace policy. This is the difference from the other parties in the Bundestag, who, when in doubt, send weapons and soldiers. But between military action and doing nothing, there are many options in the civilian sphere that a country like Germany has, and we want to talk about those first.

And that essentially brings us to the Ukraine conflict. There's the issue of arms deliveries, on which there are quite different positions within the party. You stick to your no to arms deliveries. Could you explain that again?

As internationalists, we stand with the people of Ukraine. This is our starting point: Our solidarity goes out to all those oppressed, exploited, attacked, and tortured. And from this starting point, the question now is: What methods can I best use to support them against an imperialist aggressor like Russia? There are different opinions on this.

I traveled to Ukraine, participated in various Zoom meetings with Ukrainian leftists, and explained my position, which is not the Wagenknecht position that says, "Just lay down your weapons, hand the whole country over to Russia!"—in other words, let the aggressor win—but always from a position on the side of the people of Ukraine and for a just peace. For me, this does not include agreeing to arms deliveries; that's not always easy for our Ukrainian friends to swallow.

So would you criticize the fact that Western policy towards Ukraine is not aimed at truly contributing to an end to the war and taking all possible measures to achieve it, but ultimately prolonging the war?

Yes. I would admit that the German government always had the goal of stopping or shortening the war. But it wasn't prepared to pay the price for that. For example, it wasn't prepared to impose an oil embargo overnight, because that could have harmed the German economy in competition with China and the USA.

How do you think we can get Russia to engage in serious negotiations?

I find it completely obvious that Russia hasn't shown any interest in genuine negotiations so far. Neither did Ukraine until a year ago. The question is always: How do you get warring parties to the negotiating table? Outside actors have relatively limited options, but they do exist.

What actually happens after the war in Ukraine?

The goal must be cooperative security, together with Russia and China. Cooperative security requires that all parties accept the status quo. This is how it worked during the Cold War, with Willy Brandt's policy of détente. The foundation was that both NATO and the Soviet Union accepted the demarcation of borders. And on this basis, mutual security interests could actually be taken into account, disarmament steps could be taken, and so on.

Russia currently doesn't accept the status quo. It has invaded a neighboring country, it wants to shift borders, and it wants to replace the government by force. Therefore, there is zero trust. Even if the war in Ukraine were to end now, it will take a few years to rebuild trust.

Let's turn to Gaza, where it's very clear that Israeli policy now pursues the goal of ethnically cleansing the Gaza Strip and fully annexing the West Bank. And the reason Israel can do this is because it has the full support of the United States. How could this be countered?

It's not just the full support of the US, but also, to a large extent, that of Europe. For a long time, the Israeli government's actions were at least somewhat restrained, because it was clear that as soon as it openly discussed annexation, it would receive a stop signal from Europe or the US. But now it's clear that this is no longer coming from the US, and Europe is holding back.

Now a few states are beginning to discuss the need to suspend the EU Association Agreement with Israel. This is new. But Germany and other European states are still preventing this from happening. And that's why we have to look to Germany and say: "You must change your policy towards Israel now."

I think it's absolutely right that the German government always says: Israel's right to exist is non-negotiable. We have a special German responsibility in this regard. I see it the same way, I feel it the same way, and we must take it seriously. But that must not lead to a right-wing radical government being allowed to operate unhindered.

We have this situation now, how do we get out of it?

We need a two-state solution. But having two hostile states building a high fence will never work. You can't leave the Israeli settlements on Palestinian territory, because then there wouldn't be much left of Palestine. But you can't expel them all either; there are 600,000, 700,000 settlers, some of whom have lived there for 40 years. That's not even possible within Israel.

That's why many people say the two-state solution is dead. I think that's wrong, because there are very good ideas from Israeli and Palestinian peace activists who say: We don't need two states with a high fence between them, but we need two states that are permeable to each other. Just as this permeable borders are completely normal in Europe. There are various models for this, but the core of it all is that the land is used by both parties by mutual agreement. All the peace activists in Israel tell me that this can only come from Europe.

Currently, there are attempts here to more aggressively formulate German interests and combine them with a claim to leadership. Isn't that also part of a change of course?

Yes, perhaps. So now, in light of Russian aggression, we can suddenly talk about military strength again. That was frowned upon in Germany for decades—which was good and also part of our success as an anti-militarist left. But the majority of Germans are open to it today because the major aggressor is right at our doorstep. That means that for EU and national defense, you also need the military. That is my starting point. And from this arises the question: So what do you need for EU and national defense? And then you have to say: Much less than you think, if you consistently align spending with this task. The huge sums being discussed right now are not just about EU and national defense, but also about this projection of Europe as a world power. Without that, I believe that with the current military budget, we can manage purely for EU and national defense.

Now let's assume you were Foreign Minister or even Chancellor. What would your vision for an independent German foreign policy be?

My vision is Germany as a force for peace. And that certainly includes the word "power." That may scare many leftists, but no matter how you feel about it: Germany is a power—if only as one of the world's largest economic powers. Somehow, you have influence everywhere in the world. And I would use this power for the peaceful path. And if we are part of the government in three years, to go back to the beginning, then a left-wing foreign minister would also advance the appropriate formats, such as establishing a very high-profile international peace conference.

Does the renunciation of profits – for example, if we say that we only trade with states that we find morally acceptable – work within a capitalist system?

Only with countries that we find morally acceptable – can you then even trade with yourself? Well, that's not exactly what it's about; it's about your perception of certain extreme injustices. The supply chain law, for example, was a good start. I'd say we need to initiate a global debate about paying a minimum wage everywhere. A minimum wage like in the EU, i.e. always 60 percent of the median wage; that can be calculated. And Germany then imposes special tariffs on countries that don't pay the minimum wage. You have to enforce that against hard-line economic interests, but I think it's possible. Or take Lula, Brazil's left-wing president, who is now proposing a global wealth tax. Of course, it's far too low, but the fact that there's a debate about it at all is good.

In principle, this would be capitalism constrained by ethics.

The goal of abolishing capitalism remains. But even if we, the Left, become chancellor, we won't have abolished capitalism tomorrow. Yet there are many ways to initiate a turnaround toward a different kind of economy, one that is no longer so dominated by capitalism: strengthening international standards, curbing the power of the wealthy. But I think it's illusory to believe you can complete it globally in four years. The first step is to move from violent to peaceful international relations.

A heavily abridged and slightly edited version of the interview from the first episode of “Weltunordnung,” the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation’s new podcast on international politics, hosted by Pauline Jäckels and Felix Jaitner.